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DO WE STILL NEED THE INSTITUTE, CALLED LIABILITY FOR 
GRAVER CONSEQUENCES? 
Slovenia at this very moment is in the process of remodelling its 
substantive criminal law, including the special part of its criminal code and 
among others also several incriminations including so called graver 
consequences. In 2020 an approximately 80 articles strong amendment to the 
existing Criminal Code of Slovenia (CC-1) should be adopted and put in action, 
including some new graver consequences in different existing as well as new 
incriminations. That means, that Slovenia decided not to abolish the given 
institute in its criminal law. But is this the best possible decision? 
In continental Europe the liability for graver consequences is a rather 
common legal institute, considered traditional. It is found in many modern laws 
and criminal codes around the world1. The legislator’s attempt of formulating it 
in the best possible way in the present CC-1 looks as follows (Art. 19): “If a 
graver consequence has resulted from the committing of a criminal offence for 
which there is a heavier sentence provided under the statute, such a sentence 
may be imposed on the perpetrator on condition that he has acted negligently 
with respect to the occurrence of such a consequence.” 
The wording is rather clear but the purpose, the reason of the provision, of 
the sheer existence of this institute looks far from simple. After some more 
thorough studying it turns out rather quickly, that a lot of states are not able or 
willing to use this institute precisely and systematically. Slovenia is one of them 
and it should act as an example, a typical case in this short paper.2 
If we understand the institute of liability of graver consequence inside the 
special part of the criminal law as legislator’s friendly warnings, that 
cumulations of threatening and injuring of the same criminal legal goods, 
deriving from the same act of perpetrator can occur or that cumulations of 
threats to and injuries of several legal goods, deriving from the same act of 
perpetrator can occur and that is why we have to deal with potential 
concurrence of offences, we have a clear case of silly wasting of energy and 
space in the general as well as in the special part of the criminal legislation. One 
can even say that from this point of view this is one of the roughest forms of 
redundancy in law. 
It is obvious, that the institute of liability for graver consequence, if 
understood as a crutch for users of the criminal code, who are not able and 
willing to learn and use the theory of concurrence of offences and deal 
intellectually with the theory of criminal legal goods and the consequence as an 
phenomenon of the theory of the general part of substantive criminal law, is 
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very strange and should be abolished as clearly redundant. 
Another possibility is, that we understand the institute of liability for graver 
consequence as a legislator’s warning, that from certain perpetrator’s acts 
typically, that is founded on empirical, statistical evidence certain mediate, 
indirect consequences derive. These consequences should be mentioned in the 
incrimination next to immediate, direct consequences for reasons of technical 
simplicity and economization of the general part of the criminal code to make 
the intellectual work of criminal investigation police officers, public 
prosecutors and criminal judges somehow quicker and easier. In this scenario 
we are dealing with a variation of the before mentioned form of legislator’s 
playing up to the dogmatically insufficiently educated user of the criminal code 
with very questionable practical effects. 
Only, if we perceive the institute of liability for graver consequence inside 
the special part of a given criminal legislation as a legislator’s possibility to 
prescribe - for whatever reason - different margins of punishment in 
comparison with those, achieved with the use of general rules for punishing 
concurrent offences, in that only scenario the institute seems to be acceptable as 
a crime-policy tool (but because of that not necessarily an obligatory institute of 
substantive criminal law). 
In this context we are dealing with a crime-policy instrument for more 
precise dealing with empirical typical combinations of consequences, deriving 
from forbidden acts.3 If for instance grievous bodily harm of a raped person is 
an empirically typical consequence of a rape with an object, of an armed rape, 
of a simultaneous or consecutive rape by a group of perpetrators or perhaps 
even of every rape, the legislator could be tempted to use the instrument of 
liability of graver consequence in the incrimination of rape in the form of 
grievous bodily harm of the raped victim inside the incrimination of rape. The 
prescribed margins of punishment must be higher, then foreseen with general 
rules of concurrence between the crime of rape and the crime of grievous bodily 
harm (in negligent or even intentional guilt). One cannot stress enough, that 
such an approach is rational only, if the special part of the criminal legislation 
concretizes the general idea of the institute in the general part in a systematic, 
empirically, statistically transparent way. 
The whole (rather long) history of the institute of liability for graver 
consequence is very eloquent and shows clearly, that the institute was born of 
the canonic legal rule versari in re illicita as a reflection of a special aversion of 
the legislator to the act of the perpetrator from which next to main, direct 
immediate forbidden consequences additional foreseeable typical forms of 
mediate, indirect forbidden consequences derive. It was born and developed 
through centuries as a form of hardening the punishment - elevating the lower, 
upper or both margins of punishment in comparison with general rules for 
margins of punishment in cases of concurrent offences. 
But there are strange anomalies in the system in Slovenia and its criminal 
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law in theory, legislation and judicial practice. Firstly, there are cases, where 
the institute of liability for graver consequence clearly should be used in the 
special part because of the obvious statistical appearance of mediate, indirect 
consequences in certain criminal acts, but the Slovenian legislator missed to use 
this technique without any declared and reasonable cause. I am thinking for 
instance of severe cases of sexual offences, where bodily harm of victims is 
almost a rule or at least very foreseeable in practice, as well as armed robbery 
and similar violent crimes, where the institute of liability for bodily harm as a 
liability for graver offence in Slovenia is not used by the legislator (see Art. 
206, 207, 170, 171, 172, 173 of the Slovenian CC-1). 
In other cases this institute is used in the special part, but without any clear 
distinction in effect of general punishment in concurrent offences or the effect 
of the use of the institute of liability for graver consequence is even opposite. 
The most ethically bizarre case here are several killed persons in a traffic 
accident under Art. 323 of the Slovenian CC-1, under which “(§1) A person 
participating in public traffic who, by negligent violation of the regulations on 
road safety, causes a traffic accident whereby another person is seriously 
injured, shall be punished by a fine or sentenced to imprisonment for not more 
than three years” and “(§2) If the offence under the preceding paragraph 
entails the death of one or more persons, the perpetrator shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for not less than one and not more than eight years.” If you kill 
25 persons at once negligently by for instance driving a car under influence of 
alcoholic drinks, far too fast and at the same time without any driving licence, 
the margins of punishment in Slovenia are several times(!) lower in comparison 
with killing them negligently under general provisions of the incrimination of 
killing a person in negligence (Art. 118 of the Slovenian CC-1, Negligent 
Causing of Death), although the institute of liability for graver consequence is 
used by the legislator in §2 of Art. 323 CC-1 where the death of a person is 
dealt with as a mediate, indirect consequence of a breach of regulations on road 
safety and a traffic accident is considered to be the immediate, direct 
consequence (§1 of Art. 323 CC-1). 
It is obvious, that the Slovenian institute of liability for grave consequence 
urgently needs dogmatic improvement (let alone the ethical and philosophical 
problems of legal equalling of one or several deaths in criminal law inside the 
first element of the general notion of crime), but the newest remodelling of the 
CC-1, we are facing in Slovenia at the moment is neither willing nor able to 
deal with this issue. It seems, that every new remodelling of the criminal 
legislation in Slovenia just ads new and new anomalies to the existing ones, 
erodes the system further. Since similar, although not so severe systemic 
problems can be observed in other contemporary criminal legal systems, 
especially in the so called new European democracies (further eastern bloc 
countries) too, that is why the institute of liability for grave consequence can be 
seen as a broader systematic problem in modern criminal legislation and calls 
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for more theoretical and legislative interest. It is a pity that at least in Slovenia 
there was absolutely no step further made in this regard in the last decade. 
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CASTIGATION OF MINORS AS A CIRCUMSTANCE EXCLUDING 
ILLEGALITY (A COUNTERTYPE) 
Introductory remarks (the concept and the classification of the so 
called countertypes). Not in every case does the fulfilment of the statutory 
features of a forbidden act have to be the expression of the objective social 
harmfulness of the perpetrator’s behaviour. Sometimes circumstances excluding 
illegality (the so called countertypes) occur which lead to the exclusion of the 
social harmfulness.1 In other words, there are possible exception to the rule 
(implying the negative assessment) that a behaviour fulfilling the statutory 
features of a forbidden act is characterised by social harmfulness.2 According to 
W. Wolter, the author of the concept of countertype “By countertypes we 
understand those and only those circumstances which, even though the act 
fulfils the statutory features of an act forbidden by the statute under the threat of 
punishment, make that act not socially harmful (possibly it can be positive), and 
hence not illegal; so these circumstance legalise an act generally considered to 
be illegal”.3 Every countertype is the description of a human act and its specific 
feature is that it has no autonomous sense (i.e. alone, isolated from the type, it 
makes no sense4). A countertype may therefore function only in connection 
